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RECENT DECISIONS
ZONING-Nonconforming Use-Owner of nonconforming use
has vested right to extend use from part to entirety of tract
after tract has been annexed by municipality and zoned resi-
dential. Conway v. City of Greenville (S.C. 1970).
Between 1953 and 1957, the plaintiff and her husband pur-
chased a number of plots of land totalling sixteen acres, approxi-
mately six acres located within and ten acres without the city
limits of Greenville. In 1954 the plaintiff began a construction
business on the then acquired portion of this tract. In addition
to the company's office and warehouses, she built two small
residences for members of the family and developed a small pri-
vate lake. Since the plaintiff's business was a sizeable one, a
large quantity of equipment and materials was stored in the
open on the tract, but not all of the tract was actually used for
business purposes.
In 1963 the remaining ten acres was annexed to the, City of
Greenville and, pursuant to zoning ordinances, zoned "A-1
Single-family dwelling district." In response to this, the plain-
tiff petitioned for a rezoning of the entire tract; however, only
a small portion fronting on a heavily travelled highway was
rezoned "H Light industrial district." The plaintiff did not
appeal, but continued to use the tract for business purposes as
she had before. The plaintiff later negotiated an agreement
whereby a shopping center fronting on the highway would be
built on the tract. The proposed shopping center would, how-
ever, extend from the "H Light industrial district" onto the
land zoned "A-1 Single-family dwelling district" where it would
not be permitted. The plaintiff's application for a rezoning of
the area in question to "E-1 Shopping center district" was
recommended by the City Planning and Zoning Commission, but
was subsequently rejected by the City Council of Greenville. The
master in equity for Greenville County filed a report recom-
mending relief, but the trial court reversed and dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff then appealed to the South
Carolina Supreme Court where the City of Greenville con-
tended that the plaintiff's business should be confined to its
present area and not be allowed to extend to the entire tract.1
1. In her appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the plaintiff
asserted that she was entitled to a rezoning as a matter of constitutional right
since her property was in use in a higher zoning category at the time the
property was annexed into Greenville. She also claimed that the refusal of
1
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The court, however, found for the plaintiff and held that the
nature of her business was such that she had a vested right to
extend her construction business activities to the entire tract.
Conway v. City of Greenville, 173 S.E.2d 648 (S.C. 1970).
In order to protect property owners from retroactive applica-
tion of zoning ordinances that destroy existing uses, the law
recognizes the nonconforming use 2 The term, nonconforming
use, refers to certain property which is excepted from the appli-
cation of zoning regulations. Professor Rathkopf, cited by the
court in Conway,3 explains the reason for such an exemption:
If, prior to the adoption of a zoning restriction
(either in an original zoning ordinance or an amend-
ment thereto) property was used for a then lawful
purpose or in a then lawful manner which the ordi-
nance would render thereafter prohibited and non-
conforming, such property is generally held to have
acquired a vested right to continue such non-conform-
ing use or non-conforming structure.
4
In South Carolina the right to continue a nonconforming use
of or on one's property is a vested one and was recognized as
such in James v. City of Greenville.5 This case dealt with the
authority of a municipality to enact a zoning ordinance which
would restrict the use of private property. After indicating that
the authority to zone is derived from the police power, the
James court stated that the power to enact zoning ordinances
was not unlimited and could not be used to suppress or remove
a previously established business from a residential district
without a factual showing that the continuation of the "business
would be detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare." 6
In 1967 the General Assembly of South Carolina passed an
act providing for local and regional comprehensive zoning and
the city council to rezone her property was an abuse of discretion in that it
was an arbitrary and unreasonable decision. For these reasons the plaintiff
sought to have her application for rezoning approved in accordance with her
request for use as a shopping center. The South Carolina Supreme Court
limited its decision to a determination of whether or not the plaintiff had
acquired a vested right to continue her presently nonconforming use on the
entire tract The court left unanswered the question as to whether or not the
plaintiff could now use the tract for a shopping center.
2. 2 A.H. RATHKOPF & C.A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING ch. 58 § 1 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].
3. 173 S.E2d at 651.
4. RATHKOPF ch. 58, § 1.
5. 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E.2d 661 (1955).
6. Id. at 584-85, 88 S.E.2d at 671.
19701
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planning programs 7 which enables municipalities and counties
to adopt zoning regulations in conformity with the conditions
and stipulations of the act. One section of the act describes
nonconformities and how they may be regulated.
The regulations may provide that land, buildings and
structures and the uses thereof which are lawful at the
time of the enactment or amendment of zoning regula-
tions may be continued although not in conformity with
such regulations or amendments, hereinafter called a
nonconformity. The governing authority of any munici-
pality or county may provide in the zoning ordinance
or resolution for the continuance, restoration, recon-
struction, extension, or substitution of nonconformities.
Such governing authority may also provide for the
termination of any nonconformity by specifying the
period or periods in which the nonconformity shall be
required to cease or brought into conformance, or by
providing a formula whereby the compulsory termina-
tion of nonconformities may be so fixed as to allow for
the recovery or amortization of the investment in such
nonconformity."
This statute in conjunction with the James case, which requires
a factual showing that a nonconforming use would be "detri-
mental to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare"'
before the use may be removed, provides guidelines for the
judiciary in South Carolina to determine whether a noncon-
formity may or may not be eliminated depending on the factual
situation and circumstances.
In dealing with nonconforming uses, the South Carolina
Supreme Court must, therefore, balance two opposing interests.
First, the court is under a duty to ensure that the vested rights
of an individual property owner are protected from unconstitu-
tional infringement resulting from the restrictive provisions of
a zoning ordinance passed after the owner has commenced his
presently nonconforming use of the property. Second, the court
must help promulgate the general policy of restricting and
eliminating nonconforming uses in order to promote the general
zoning scheme.10 The Conway case reflects the court's continu-
7. S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 14-341 to -350.46 (Supp. 1969).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-350.17 (Supp. 1969).
9. 227 S.C. at 584-85, 88 S.E2d at 671.
10. RATHxOPF ch. 60, § 1.
[Vol. 22
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ing attempt to maintain this balance by resorting to a deter-
mination based on the facts of a given situation.
In reaching its decision in Conway, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court employed a flexible formula which was first stated
in the New Jersey case of Gross v. Allan." In that case the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that a property owner's display of single used automobiles at
his service station from time to time, prior to the enactment of
a zoning ordinance, did not establish a nonconforming use of
the property as a used automobile sales lot. The New Jersey
court stated:
The criterion is whether the nature of the incipient
nonconforming use, in the light of the character and
adaptability to such use of the entire parcel, manifestly
implies an appropriation of the entirety to such use
prior to the adoption of the restrictive ordinance.
12
The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the facts sur-
rounding the case and found that the extension of the plaintiff's
use to the entire tract was implied, gven the "character of the
tract as business property and its adaptability to such use."' 3
The court concluded, therefore, that an appropriation of the
entirety for the plaintiff's use prior to the adoption of the
zoning ordinance was implied from the facts and circumstances
of the case.
After deciding that a nonconforming use within a single tract
of land may be extended to the entire tract, the Conway court
elaborated on the powers of the judiciary to review discretionary
decisions of local zoning authorities. Prior to this case, the
South Carolina court gave great weight to the findings of local
authorities and stated that the court would only exercise its
power to declare an ordinance invalid if the ordinance or regu-
lation was so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional
rights; even then the power would be exercised "carefully and
cautiously."' 4 In Conway the court appears to have exerted its
power of review with less restraint. Citing James v. City of
11. 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275 (1955); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 22
(1963); 58 AM. Jun. Zoning § 151 (1948); 101 CJ.S. Zoning § 192 (1958);
RATHKOPF ch. 60, § 2.
12. 37 N.J. Super. at 272, 117 A.2d at 280.
13. 173 S.E.2d at 651.
14. Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S.C. 268, 276, 143 S.E.2d 527, 531
(1965) ; Bob Jones Univ. v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 351, 360, 133 S.E.2d
843, 847 (1963); Talbot v. Myrtle Beach Bd. of Adjustment, 222 S.C. 165,
174, 72 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1952).
1970]
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Greenville, the Conway court emphasized that "the determina-
tion of whether such ordinances deprive a citizen of constitu-
tional rights is a judicial function and not legislative."15 In
accounting for its power of review, the court made no mention
of a presumption in favor of local authorities or of the careful
and cautious exercise of the power of review as the earlier cases
had.16 It seems probable that the court, in so doing, was qualify-
ing its previous decisions by stating that it would intervene
when it sensed a serious injustice had been forced upon an indi-
vidual because of an indiscretion or an unreasonable or arbi-
trary decision by a local authority.
The court in Conway concluded that a property owner has a
vested right to pursue his nonconforming use by extending the
use from a part to the entirety of the parcel; however, he may
do so only if the entire parcel is adaptable to the use which
predominated in the previously limited portion."' The court left
open the question of whether or not the "A-1 Single-family
dwelling district" should be rezoned for commercial purposes so
as to allow the construction of the proposed shopping center.
Whether the plaintiff now has a right to use the tract for the
construction of a shopping center is for the City of Greenville
to determine, subject once again to the review of the courts.
Should the city refuse to grant a rezoning and claim that a
willful discontinuance of the plaintiff's current nonconforming
use (removal of her construction business in order to build a
shopping center) extinguishes that use, the South Carolina
Supreme Court may have the opportunity to review the case
again in light of these possible developments.
GERALD E. BBRNDT
15. 173 S.E2d at 65Z.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 173 S.E2d at 651.
(Vol. I2
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LABOR RELATIONS-Injunctions-Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not prohibit federal court from enjoining strike where it is un-
disputed that the grievance in question is subject to adjustment
and arbitration under collective bargaining agreement, that
employer is ready to proceed with arbitration at the time injunc-
tion is sought, and that employer is suffering and will continue
to suffer irreparable injury through violation of no-strike obli-
gation. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Local 770 (Sup. Ct.
1970).
In February, 1969, the petitioner, Boys Markets, Inc., and the
respondent, Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, were parties to a
contract which provided, inter alia, that all controversies con-
cerning its interpretation or application should be resolved by
adjustment and arbitration procedures set forth therein' and
further expressly provided that there would be no work stop-
pages.2 In spite of these contractual provisions, the respondent
union called a strike over a labor dispute and began to picket
the petitioner's establishment. When the respondent union did
not accede to the petitioner's demands for cessation of the work
stoppage and operation of the arbitration procedures specified
in the contract, the petitioner filed a complaint in the California
Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order, a pre-
liminary and permanent injunction, and specific performance
of the contractual arbitration provisions.
The state court issued a temporary restraining order; the case
was thereafter removed to a federal district court at the respond-
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Local 770, 90 S. Ct. 1583 n.3
(1970), quoting in part contractual provisions:
A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT.
Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of
any kind or character existing between the parties and arising
out of or in any way involving the interpretation or application
of the terms of this Agreement ... [with certain exceptions
not relevant to the instant case] shall be settled and resolved by
the procedures and in the manner hereinafter set forth.
C. ARBITRATION.
1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved in Para-
graph B hereinabove shall be submitted to arbitration for final
determination upon written demand of either party ....
2. Id. n.4, quoting in part contractual provisions:
Work stoppages. Matters subject to the procedures of this Article
shall be settled and resolved in the manner provided herein. During
the term of this Agreement, there shall be no cessation or stoppage
of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts, except that this limitation
shall not be binding upon either party hereto if the other party
refuses to perform any obligation under this Article or refuses or
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ent's request. The district court ordered the parties to arbitrate
the underlying dispute and simultaneously enjoined the strike,
all picketing in the vicinity of the petitioner's supermarket, and
any attempts by the union to induce the employees to strike or
to refuse to perform their services. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, considering itself bound by Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson,3 reversed. 4 On certiorari, the Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case with directions to enter a judgment affirming the order of
the district court. Boys Market, Inc. v. RetaiZ Clerk's Local 770,
90 S. Ct. 1583 (1970).
In 1932, in response to the unequal bargaining position of em-
ployees with their employers, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,G which contained provisions precluding the
federal courts from issuing restraining orders or injunctions
prohibiting employees from striking. Subsequent thereto, in
1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act),G which provided authority for bringing
suits in federal district courts for violations of contracts between
employers and labor organizations. The above-mentioned provi-
sions at first glance seem to be non-conflicting, but further study
of the purpose of the legislation and the decisions based on these
laws will reveal the anomalous situation that existed before Boys
Markets. A brief history of the legislation and a synthesis of the
applicable decisions will explain this anomaly.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted in an era when the
bargaining power of labor was inferior to what it is today. The
federal courts were regarded as allies of management in its
struggle against the organization and strengthening of labor
unions; and the injunction was often employed against the
activities of organized labor.7 The purpose of the Norris-La-
3. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
4. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Local 770, 416 F.2d 368 (1969).
5. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C.A. § 104 (1965) reads in part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute ......
6. Labor-Management Relations Act § 301 (a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (1965)
reads:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organi-
zations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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Guardia Act was to bring some order out of the industrial chaos
that had developed and to correct the abuses which had resulted
from the interjection of the federal judiciary into union-man-
agement disputes.8 The effect of the Act was to limit severely
the federal courts' injunctive powers in cases involving labor
disputes.9 The Norris-LaGuardia Act was followed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the policy of which was to curb
unfair practices by employers which tended to discourage em-
ployee participation in collective action.10
As labor organizations grew in strength, congressional em-
phasis shifted from protection of the labor movement to the
encouragement of collective bargaining for peaceful resolution
of labor disputes."' In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. The public policy underlying national labor
legislation (as interpreted under the Act) was to promote the
arbitral process.12 Even though the emphasis was changed, the
prior-mentioned statutes remained in effect without amendment.
Therefore, on many occasions the Supreme Court has had the
8. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1965) reads:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the juris-
diction and authority of the courts of the United States, as such
jurisdiction and authority are defined and limited in this chapter,
the public policy of the United States is declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions ... the individual
unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it
is necessary that to have full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such repre-
sentatives or in self-organization or on other concerted activities
for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
9. See note 5 supra.
10. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151
(1965) reads in part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce [unfair labor practices) and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exer-
cise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
11. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 'U.S. 564 (1960).
12. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 nn. 91 and 93 (1965).
1970]
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task of accommodating the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act with national labor policy as delineated
in subsequently enacted legislation.13
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mlls,14 the Supreme
Court stated that section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act does more than merely give federal district courts
jurisdiction in labor disputes and "that the substantive law to
apply in suits under section 301(a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws."15 Lincoln Mills was followed five years later by Clarles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney"8 in which the sole issue was whether
section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act operates
to divest state courts of jurisdiction in labor disputes. The Su-
preme Court held that the purpose of enacting section 301(a)
was to supplement the jurisdiction of state courts and not to
replace it.
A long line of cases which promoted the arbitral processes and
discouraged the use of self-help measures by either party to a
dispute'7 was followed by Sinclair Refining Co. v. Athinson. 18
In this case the Supreme Court held that the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been repealed
or amended by any subsequent legislation and that these provi-
sions still barred federal courts from enjoining labor strikes.
While recognizing the problems that might arise in the wake of
this decision, the Court felt it was bound by the plain import of
the enactment and stated:
[T]he language of the specific provisions of the Act is
so broad and inclusive that it leaves not the slightest
opening for reading in any exceptions beyond those
clearly written into it by Congress itself.19
Three Justices, dissenting vigorously, stated that, while the
Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been repealed by section 301 (a)
13. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957).
14. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
115. Id. at 456.
16. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
17. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
19. Id. at 202.
[Vol. 22
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of the Labor Management Relations Act, the two acts conflict
and, therefore, must be accommodated so that the central pur-
poses of each will be given the fullest possible effect.
20
To further complicate the situation, in Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge 73521 the Supreme Court held that this case (a labor dis-
pute) arose under the "laws of the United States" within the
meaning of the removal statute2 2 and was removable to a federal
district court at the defendant's request. The concurring opinion
of three Justices noted that the decision left important unan-
swered questions.
2 3
When the foregoing decisions and statutes are considered as
a whole, the result is an anomalous situation. The removals
under Avco, which the defendants will necessarily request when
injunctive relief is sought, coupled with the injunctive prohibi-
tions of Sinclair, for all practical purposes divest state courts of
jurisdiction in labor disputes where injunctive relief is sought.
This partial divesting of state court jurisdiction is wholly incon-
sistent with Dowd Bow which held that section 301 (a) was to
supplement state court jurisdiction and not to replace it. This
result, moreover, does nothing to foster the federal policy of
labor law uniformity stated in Local 174 Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co.,24 because, theoretically, widely disparate remedies
remain available in state, as opposed to federal, courts. As stated
by the Court in Boys Markets:
The injunction, however, is so important a remedial
device, particularly in the arbitration context, that its
availability or non-availability in various courts will
not only produce rampant forum-shopping and maneuv-
20. Id. at 216 (Brennan, Douglas, & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
21. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1965) reads:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without
regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought.
23. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 562 (1968) (Stewart,
Harlan, & Brennan, JJ., concurring opinion). The basis for the district court's.
dissolution of the injunction issued by the Tennessee state court was not clear.
It is uncertain whether the action was required by Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), or because of the district court's equity powers
or both. The concurring opinion limited the holding and expressly delayed to
an appropriate future occasion a decision on the effect of Sinclair on situations
where a case in which injunctive relief is sought is removed to a federal dis-
trict court.
24. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
1970]
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ering from one court to another but will also greatly
frustrate any relative uniformity in the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.
25
The removal of actions involving labor disputes where injunctive
relief is sought solely to avoid the requested relief implies to
section 301(a) a purpose, (divesting state courts of jurisdic-
tion), which has never been imputed to it.
After rejecting the extending of the Sinclair decision to the
states on the grounds that there was no congressional intent in
either the Norris-LaGuardia Act or Labor Management Rela-
tions Act section 301(a) to deprive state courts of their injunc-
tive powers and noting that the effectiveness of arbitration
agreements and no-strike obligations would be seriously under-
mined, the Court concluded that Sinclair went against our na-
tional labor policy and should be reconsidered. The Court
limited the holding in this case and adopted from the dissent in
Sinclair the overriding considerations on which injunctive relief
could properly be ordered:
1. The contract must contain provisions which require
both parties to arbitrate.
2. The party requesting injunctive relief must show his
willingness to arbitrate.
3. Injunctive relief must be proper when the ordinary
principles of equity are considered, e.g., irreparable
injury to one party, relative hardship on the
parties. 28
Finding the factual situation in Boys Markets within the scope
of the above-listed criteria, the Court reversed and remanded the
case with directions to reinstate the injunctive relief granted by
the district court.
27
In overruling Sinclair, the Supreme Court resolved an anom-
alous situation in the area of labor relations. Although the
method by which this problem was resolved may be subject to
attack 28 the result reached by the Court makes existing labor
25. 90 S. Ct. 1583, 1590 (1970).
26. 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962).
27. 90 S. Ct. 1583, 1594 (1970).
28. Id. at 1595-98 (Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black, in dissenting,
says that judicial reinterpretation is improper for the Court except in the area
of constitutional law or when there are extraordinary circumstances which are
not present in Boys Markets. The majority, in rejecting his views, said that it
was not mechanically bound by stare decisis and that Sinclair must be recon-
sidered as that decision was contrary to the national labor policy.
(Vol. 2
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laws more compatible with court decisions in this area. The cen-
tral purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of fostering the
growth and viability of labor organizations2 9 is not sacrificed.
The main effect of the decision in Boys Markets on future
litigation will be to promote the mutual responsibility necessary
to vitalize collective bargaining agreements by allowing the
courts to enforce these agreements.
M. K. FAnm
29. Id. at 1593.
1970]
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Secured Transactions-De-
fendant's knowledge of conflicting security interest in certain
collateral did not, under Uniform Commercial Code section 9-
312(4), defeat his purchase money security interest. Nobe Co. 'V.
Mack Financial Corp. (R.I. 1970).
The plaintiff sold three Autocar trucks to ABC Truck Rentals
Inc. and received in payment three promissory notes, a chattel
mortgage, and a security agreement.' Thereafter, ABC Truck
Rentals, with the plaintiff's conditional consent,2 traded two of
the Autocar trucks to Mack Trucks Inc. as part of the purchase
price on two new Mack trucks. The remainder of the purchase
price was covered by a second security agreement wherein Mack
Trucks retained a purchase money security interest in the two
Mack trucks.
The defendant, assignee of the security interest created by the
agreement between ABC Truck Rentals and Mack Trucks, re-
possessed the two Mack trucks after ABC's default. In order to
protect his interest in the Mack trucks, which were proceeds of
the sale of the Autocar trucks, the plaintiff brought an action
to enjoin the sale of the two Mack trucks and to adjudicate the
validity of his security interest in the Mack trucks.
At a hearing the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to
restrain the sale of the Mack trucks at public auction, but stated
that the plaintiff's rights, if any, would not be destroyed by such
a sale and would attach to the proceeds of the sale. The defend-
ant's sale having failed to produce sufficient funds to cover the
amount due the plaintiff, a second hearing was necessary. At this
hearing the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,3
and the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in affirming the su-
perior court's decision to dismiss, eld that the defendant's pur-
chase money security interest in the collateral had priority,
regardless of his knowledge of the plaintiff's conflicting security
1. The plaintiff did not file a financing statement pursuant to UIFOPM
CoMMEMC A. CODE § 9-302 (1962 version) ; therefore the security interest was
unperfected.
2. The conditions were (1) that ABC Truck Rentals obtain a $20,000 loan
from the Small Business Administration and (2) that the proceeds resulting
from the operation of the new trucks be used to reduce ABC's indebtedness
to the plaintiff.
3. R.I.R. Crv. P. 12(b) (6), constried in Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers
World Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 227 A.2d 582 (1967).
[Vol. 2
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interest. Noble Go. v. Mack Financial Corp., 264 A.2d 325 (R.I.
1970).
In response to the issue of priority between conflicting secur-
ity interests, the defendant's argument on appeal was centered
around the trial judge's statement that the plaintiff's conditional
consent to the sale of the two Autocar trucks to ABC Truck
Rentals released his security interest and that Mack Trucks was
entitled to act upon this consent without fear of a revesting of
the plaintiff's security interest. The plaintiff's argument was
based upon three similar considerations: (1) that Mack Trucks
accepted the two Autocar trucks with actual notice of the con-
flicting security interest in the plaintiff; (2) that the conditional
nature of the plaintiff's consent did not constitute a waiver of
his security interest; and (3) that the defendant acquired the
two Mack trucks subject to the plaintiff's security interest.
4
Rhode Island having adopted the Uniform Commercial Code,
the Noble court referred to the applicable sections of the Code
in order to decide the case.5 The plaintiff's first contention was
that section 9-301 (1) (b)( of the U.C.C. was decisive of the
question of priority between the conflicting security interests
because the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's
prior security interest in the two Autocar trucks traded by ABC
to the defendant's assignor. The plaintiff asserted that, in order
for the defendant's security interest to be paramount to his
unperfected security interest, the two Mack trucks must have
been sold and the security agreement executed without knowl-
edge of the plaintiff's interest in the traded Autocar trucks. The
court noted that the plaintiff's contention would have been cor-
rect had the security interest in question been one in the original
two Autocar trucks; however, since the interest involved related
to the two Mack trucks, the court found that the plaintiff's
assertion was not applicable.
7
Having answered the plaintiff's first contention, the court then
turned to the question of the plaintiff's rights in the two Mack
trucks; the two trucks represented proceeds of the sale of col-
lateral as to the security agreement between the plaintiff and
4. Noble Co. v. Mack Financial Corp., 264 A.2d 325, 327 (R.I. 1970).
5. The court noted that neither party cited a helpful case and also that
their own research revealed no case to resolve the issue.
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 (1962 version) provides:
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights
of . .. (b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowl-
edge of the security interest and before it is perfected ....
7. Noble Co. v. Mack Financial Corp., 264 A.2d 325, 328 (R.I. 1970).
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ABC Truck Rentals and collateraZ as to the security agreement
between ABC and Mack Trucks. The court cited paragraph 3 of
the commentator's notes relating to section 9-306 which states:
In many cases a purchaser or other transferee of col-
lateral will take free of a security interest: in such cases
the secured party's only right will be to proceeds. The
transferee will take free whenever the disposition was
authorized; the authorization may be contained in the
security agreement or otherwise given.2
Applying the above comment to the facts of the case, the court
found that the plaintiff had an unperfected security interest in
the proceeds of the sale of the two Autocar trucks, that is, in the
two Mack trucks. The court's examination of the defendant's
position disclosed that he also had a security interest in the two
Mack trucks, the particular type of interest being a purchase
money security interest.10
Having determined the classification of the security interest of
each party in the two Mack trucks, the court again turned to the
U.C.C. to ascertain the order of priority. Section 9-30111 guided
the court to section 9-312, which reads in part:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other
than inventory has priority over a conflicting security
interest in the same collateral if the purchase money
security interest is perfected at the time the debtor
receives possession of the collateral or within ten days
thereafter.
12
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(2) (1962 version) reads:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other dis-
position thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized by
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any indentifiable proceeds including collections re-
ceived by the debtor.
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306, Comment 3.
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107 (1962 version) reads:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral
to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by
making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.
See generally Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HA~v. L. Rrv. 1333,
1370 (1963); Kenan, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Validity, Rights
of the Parties, Default, 44 N.C.L. Rr'v. 716, 731 (1966).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 (1962 version) states in part:
"[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of (a) persons
entitled to priority under Section 9-312; ...."
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(4) (1962 version).
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The court placed emphasis on the official comments to this sec-
tion; the pertinent provisions state:
There is no requirement that the purchase money
secured party be without notice or knowledge of the
other interest; he takes priority although he knows of
it or it has been filed.'3
In conclusion the Noble court found that Uniform Commer-
cial Code section 9-312(4) and the comment thereto clearly
establish that the defendant's purchase money security interest
takes priority over the plaintiff's unperfected security interest.14
The decisive provisions of the Rhode Island version of the
Uniform Commercial Code are identical to those adopted in this
state. It is suggested that the Rhode Island Supreme Court prop-
erly interpreted and applied the applicable Code sections and
that South Carolina would be in accord with the decision
reached in this case.15
DAVID R. GRAvELY
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312, Comment 3.
14. See generally Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. Rxv.
838, 861 (1959); Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REV.
1333, 1385 (1963) ; Meek, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Conmer-
cial Code, 18 ARK. L. REv. 30, 46 (1964); Smith, Article Nine: Secured
Transactions-Perfection and Priorities, 44 N.C.L. Rxv. 753, 802 (1966);
Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 9 (1970).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-312 (Supp. 1966) (South Carolina Reporter's
Comments) ; Symposium-Secured Financing Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 S.C.L. REv. 681, 729 (1967).
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CRIMINAL LAW-Informing Accused of His Rights-Appli-
cation of the Miranda decision to custodial interrogation by
security guard employed by mercantile establishment and com-
missioned by the governor. Pratt v. State (Md. 1970).
The defendant, Pratt, while engaged in an apparent attempt
to steal merchandise belonging to Montgomery Ward, Inc., was
observed by McKinley, a security guard employed by that cor-
poration and commissioned by the Governor to protect its prop-
erty. McKinley apprehended the defendant and took him to the
store's security office where, in the course of interrogation, he
made statements which were self-incriminating.
At the trial the defense counsel objected to the admission of
these statements on the ground that the defendant had not been
advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona.1
The trial judge overruled the objection, and the defendant was
subsequently convicted of grand larceny. On appeal the Court
of Special Appeals held that the admission of the incriminating
statement into evidence was reversible error, because McKinley
was a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of
Miranda and, therefore, should have given the required warn-
ings. Pratt v. State, 263 A.2d 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
The Miranda Court did not specify what types of persons
might come within the scope of the term, "law enforcement
officers."2 Thus, the real issue in Pratt was whether McKinley
was a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of
Miranda. The state conceded that the procedural safeguards set
out in Miranda were not employed by McKinley; the court
recognized, moreover, that the defendant's statements were the
result of custodial interrogation 3
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. [Tlhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial inter-
rogation, we mean questioning initialed by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the pro-
cedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.
384 U.S. at 444 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
3. 263 A.2d 247, 248-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
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Relying on a prior case, Minorv. State,4 the Pratt court stated
that the Miranda prohibitions "'apply to law enforcement offi-
cers representing the state and not to persuasion by private per-
sons.' ", In this case the court noted, however, that the state had
adduced that McKinley "was sworn as a State officer by the
State of Maryland, [and] by the Governor of Maryland as a
police officer to protect the property of Montgomery Wards." 6
McKinley was considered a state police officer because a Mary-
land statute so provided3 Relying on this statute, the Pratt
court concluded:
[AIny corporation operating a mercantile establishment
in Maryland may apply to the Governor to commission
such persons as the corporation may designate "to act
as policemen" for the protection of the property of
such corporation, and for the preservation of peace and
good order in their respective premises.
8
The court went on to point out that such a "policeman," after
he has taken the prescribed oath,9 shall
possess and exercise, in the counties and cities in which
the property of the corporation for which he was
appointed is situated, "all the authority and powers
held and exercised by constables at common law and
under the statutes of this state, and also the authority
and powers conferred by law on policemen in the City
of Baltimore."10
The compensation of such a policeman shall be paid by the
4. 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d 113 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
5. 263 A2d at 249, quoting from Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 87, 250
A.2d 113, 116 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
6. 263 A.2d at 249.
7. MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, §§ 342-348 (1957) and art. 41, §§ 60-70, were
repealed by ch. 581, Acts 1969, effective 1 July 1969, which enacted §§ 60-70.
For the purposes of the question involved in the Pratt case, the two statutes
do not differ materially.
8. 263 A.2d at 249.
9. The oath which such "policemen" must take is prescribed by MD. CONsT.
art. 1, § 6:
I, . . . , do swear, (or affirm, as the case may be,) that I will
be faithful and bear true allegiance to the State of Maryland, and
support the Constitution and laws thereof; and that I will, to the
best of my skill and judgment, diligently and faithfully, without
partiality or prejudice, execute the office of ..., according to
the Constitution and Laws of this State, ....
10. 263 A2d at 249-50 (footnotes omitted), quoting from MD. CODE ANN.
art. 23, § 344 (1957).
19701
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4 'party or parties upon whose recommendation he was ap-
pointed."11
Thus, the Pratt court concluded that McKinley, having been
appointed as a policeman under the authority of the statute, was
indeed an officer of the state with the power to arrest "for the
protection of the property of the corporation requesting his
appointment, and for the preservation of peace and good order
on its premises."1 2 Citing Tolclester Beac1h Imp. Co. v. Stein-
neier,13 the Pratt court pointed out that a person so appointed
C 'was responsible to the State for the proper discharge of his
duty and not to the company ... His duty was the same as
any other policeman or constable.' " The Pratt court concluded
that McKinley's actions constituted state action by citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Grffin v. Maryland'5 :
If an individual is possessed of state authority and
purports to act under that authority, his action is state
action. It is irrelevent that he might have taken the
same action had he acted in a purely private capacity or
that the particular action which he took was not author-
ized by state law.16
Based on its determination that McKinley was a state officer
and that his actions constituted state action, the Pratt court
found it "crystal clear that McKinley was a 'law enforcement
officer' within the meaning of Miranda."12 The court therefore
determined that the introduction into evidence of the statement
made by the defendant was reversible error. The court held the
admission reversible error, because "Miranda baldly stated that
absent the warnings it set out 'no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against [a defendant].' ,"s The
Pratt court then cited MuZligan v. State'9 as authority for the
11. MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 346 (1957) repealed by ch. 581, Acts 1969,
effective 1 July 1969, enacted art. 41, § 67.
12. 263 A.2d at 250.
13. 72 Md. 313, 20 A. 188 (1890).
14. 263 A.2d at 250, quoting from Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Steinmeier,
72 Md. 313, 318, 20 A. 188, 190 (1890).
15. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
16. 263 A.2d at 250, quoting from Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135
(1964).
17. 263 A.2d at 250.
18. Id. at 251, quoting from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
19. 6 Md. App. 603, 252 A.2d 476 (Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
While the procedural guidelines and the exclusionary rules [Mi-
randa] enunciated did not result in a discard of the old voluntari-
ness test entirely, we think it clear from the opinion that if the
[Vol. 22
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proposition that a statement such as that made by the appellant
"is per se to be excluded and that the state is permitted no
opportunity to show that it was harmless error."20
After Miranda, other courts faced problems similar to those
encountered by the Pratt court. 21 In a 1967 California case,
People v. Wright,2 2 the court held that a security guard em-
ployed by the Los Angeles County General Hospital did not
belong to the class of "'authorities'" who had to give the
Miranda warnings. The California court based their decision on
the fact that the primary mission of the governmental agency
that employed the security guard was not the enforcement of the
law. This case differs from Pratt in that there was no showing
that the hospital security guard had any type of state commis-
sion. The California court did not consider it material that the
employee's duties were confined to the protection of persons or
property on his employer's premises, or that his employer was
a governmental entity. The -Wright court did, however, stress
that what mattered was whether the person was employed by an
agency of government whose primary mission was to enforce the
law. The California court was careful to point out that, by
"employed," they did not mean to imply that the person had to
be paid for his services or render them on a steady basis.
23
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not been faced with
the question presented to the court in Pratt. It appears, however,
that the same question could be raised, since it is conceivable to
have privately employed security guards receive a commission,
without compensation, from the Governor.
24
procedural guidelines are not followed, a statement obtained is per
se to be excluded, permitting the State no opportunity to show that
the admission of a statement so obtained was harmless error, ....
Id. at 478.
20. 263 A.2d at 251.
21. See generally State v. Lombardo, 104 Ariz. 598, 457 P.2d 275 (1969);
People v. Ulcek, 114 Ill. App. 2d 74, 252 N.E.2d 377 (1969) ; People v. Frank,
52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
22. 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1967).
23. Id. at 782. See also United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 415 (W.D.
Tex. 1969).
24. S.C. CODE ANsi. § 53-3 (1962) provides:
The Governor may, at his discretion, appoint such deputies, con-
stables and detectives as he may deem necessary to assist in detec-
tion of crime and the enforcement of any criminal laws of this
State, the salaries and expenses of such deputies, constables and
detectives appointed to be paid as provided for by law. Appoint-
ments by the Governor may be made hereunder without compensa-
tion from the State. Any appointments made hereunder may be
revoked by the Governor at his pleasure, whether the appointee be
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While the Pratt case is actually more of a clarification of the
Miranda decision than an extension of the doctrine set forth in
that case, it does have the general effect of extending Miranda'8
application to a group other than law enforcement officials
employed and compensated by some branch of government.
EBE T THoxAs MoINxrosir, JR.
paid by the State or not. All appointments under the provisions of
this section shall expire sixty days after the expiration of the term
of the Governor making such appointments.
See also S.C. CODn Aru. § 56-641 (1962).
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